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The Teaching of Practice and Procedure in
Law Schools
By EDSON R. SUNDERLAND
Professor of Law, University of Michigan

(A paper read before the Association of American Law Schools at Montreal, Canada, September 1, 1913.)

C

RITICISM
of profession
the law, the
and the legal
is courts,
one of

the popular customs of the day. So constantly and so insistently are we told of
the shortcomings of the Bench and Bar
that it is hard to hold one's footing
against the sweep of the current. One
might well suppose from all the clamor

that the ancient respectability of the law
had suddenly been discovered to be a
monstrous pretense, a fraud on the innocence and trustfulness of the people, a
cloak for injustice and a mask for oppression.
But the whole phenomenon is simply
an instance of the overemphasis which
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always characterizes the human attitude.
And this is not to be deprecated, for only
in that way can social inertia be overcome and the impulse toward reform be
given the necessary momentum.
Progress is an alternating, not a continuous, movement. In all phases of life
a period of hopeful activity is normally
succeeded by a period of critical retrospect. We push ahead with our work
and our plans until something goes
wrong, and then we stop, try to diagnose
the trouble, revise our program in the
light of our experience, and go on again
along new lines. This ebb and flow of
thought and action is characteristic of
life. Hegel, the greatest philosopher
of modern times, found in it a basis for
a theory of metaphysics in which he exhibited the world as a systematic selfdevelopment through the agency of this
inherent tendency to intermittent movement due to the experimental nature of
all rational progress. Such a philosophy
is full of the sparkle of optimism, for it
turns our mistakes into indispensable
stepping stones to better things.
We are now in the midst of a critical
stage in this process of social self-development. Things have not turned out as
well as we anticipated, and we have
stopped to analyze the situation and propose remedies. Disappointment and discontent are widespread and the spirit of
unrest pervades everything. Nothing
has entirely escaped.
It would be strange indeed if the law,
which touches society so closely, were
not included in the dragnet indictment
which public opinion has found against
modern social institutions. But the gist
of the charge has been the administration
of the law, not the law itself. With popular legislative assemblies constantly employed in enacting statutes with the sole
apparent purpose of pleasing every pass-

ing whim of the people, there could
hardly be any plausible excuse for the
complaint that the lawmaking power is
not responsive to popular wishes. The
people seem to have just the laws and
all the laws they want. Statutes appear
quite fully abreast of current ideas.
But it is different with legal administration. Here the people act through a
highly trained but conservative profession, the members of which are not directly responsible to the electorate. The
legislature may formulate the standards
for admission to the Bar, but the Bar fixes its own standards of professional conduct. Discretion necessarily plays so
large a part in judicial administration,
and personal capacity and skill are such
determining factors in the complex problems of professional work of all kinds,
that the legislature can do scarcely more
than prescribe formal rules for the guidance of litigation. It can do little to control the manner of their use. But while
the profession feels its independence,
cherishes its ideals, honors its traditions,
and pursues its way in comparative freedom from the fussy regulation of the legislature, it is subject to a power far more
potent. The inexorable laws of supply
and demand, of competition and the survival of the fittest, guide the destiny of
the lawyer as well as the wage-earner or
the business man. These are laws of nature which nothing can withstand.
Lawyers are quasi-public servants.
They are licensed and employed to accomplish certain purposes. They exist
for the benefit of the public. Those who
offer what the public will not have must
change their ways or go unemployed.
The public has become convinced that
there is gross inefficiency in the administration of the law. It has weighed current procedure in the balance and found
it wanting. There is too much delay, ex-
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pense, and uncertainty about it. It does
not produce results commensurate with
the effort employed.
Many causeq contribute to this. One
is that there is too little regard paid to
the finer ethical standards in the employment of the processes of the law. Technical rules are capable of a beneficent
and a malignant use. The lawyer is
much less likely to forget his duty to his
client than to the court and the public.
In the stress and strain of litigation he
is too ready to resort to technicalities for
the purpose of confusing the evidence,
diverting the issues, and laying a founda-,
tion for a vexatious appeal, when success
upon the merits seems out of reach. It
is the "nuisance value" of the rules of
procedure which then appeals to him,
and it is their "nuisEance value" that has
discouraged and disgusted the public.
No legislation can reach this problem.
It is essentially ethical, and the solution
lies with the Bench and Bar.
But concurrent with this perverted
view of the function of procedure is an
apparently inconsistent condition, namely, widespread lack of precision and effectiveness in the use of procedure. We
lose our respect for what we habitually
misuse. Its logic is lost in the maze of
its petty rules; its true purpose is forgotten in the stress of the case in hand.
But procedure, when rightly considered, is the very life of the law. It is that
which renders litigation possible. Procedure is merely the means of co-ordinating effort, of harmonizing differences,
of offering every one equality of opportunity in offense and defense before the
law. Without it there would be confusion, favoritism, and injustice. If the
subject were viewed in this fundamental
way, and were studied conscientiously as
an incident and aid to the development
and determination of the merits of con-
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troversies, the criticisms now so fiercely
directed against it would largely disappear. In its use it is indispensable, in its
abuse only does it cause trouble. A professional conscience to curb that abuse,
and professional learning and skill to
direct its proper use, are the two needs
of the time.
Perhaps the law schools have a part
to play in the attainment of both these
ends. For law and ethics are twin sisters. But the primary problem of the
schools is to develop true and comprehensive intellectual conceptions. So far
as procedure is concerned, it seems clear
that they have failed to appreciate the
magnitude of the task and have done little to correct the deficiencies which the
public is so insistently pointing out.
Procedure has always been a difficult
and technical* part of the law. In its
primitive condition, law was not much
more than a system of procedural forms.
Gradually the law of rights obtained the
ascendency over the law of remedies, and
procedure lost its claim to an independent valuation and became a means to the
investigation and determination of litigated controversies.
Viewing procedure in this modern
way, two aspects at once present themselves for consideration. It may be looked at as both a mechanism and a mode
of operation. And this distinction is important. Let there be devised ever so
good a system, yet its value may be destroyed by clumsy methods of use. On
the other hand, with a crude and cumbersome system excellent results may be
reached by operative skill. The system
itself is a matter over which the legislature has assumed direct jurisdiction,
while the mode and manner of its application has necessarily been left largely
to the Bench and Bar.
Such a division of responsibility is un-
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fortunate, for there is so close an interrelation between the machinery and its
operation that a constant and free co-adjustment should be at all times possible.
The excellence of a procedural system
is to be tested by the ease with which it
lends itself to practical use. As practice
discloses weaknesses in its fabric, the
practitioners themselves should be free
to devise amendments and changes calculated to remedy such defects. The users
should be also the designers and adjusters. Such is the case in England, where
the judges enact and amend the rules
which they themselves administer.
But the legal profession in the United
States, though it may not have direct authority and control over the rules of procedure, is nevertheless charged with the
duty of doing the best it can with the
means at its command. If those means
are thought to be not of the best, so
much the more skill is called for on the
part of the profession. Lawyers may
not be immediately responsible for fancied imperfections in the system, but
they are certainly chargeable with inefficiency in the use of it.
It must also be remembered that procedure is the one branch over which the
legal profession is vested with a peculiar
and exclusive jurisdiction. While the
trained lawyer must understand legal
relations in all their phases if he is to be
a proper adviser for his clients, his professional characteristic is his authority,
and presumably his ability, to use the
procedural machinery of the law. Many
lawyers never go into court, and confine
themselves to a consultation practice.
But their advice is predicated upon an
understanding of what they might be
permitted or required to do if they were
to resort to the courts, and, though they
do not themselves employ procedural

processes, the value of their suggestions
depends upon the accuracy with which
they gauge the procedural possibilities in
the case before them.
The legal profession in the United
States has never taken procedure as seriously as has the profession in England,
and it would hardly be amiss to ascribe
our much-criticised inefficiency quite
largely to this cause. The English professional system, with its division of
functions between barristers and solicitors, is based upon the broad doctrine
that procedure is of first importance.
The barrister is the trial lawyer. He is
also a consultation lawyer. A consultation practice is thus combined with the
most technically exacting work of trial
practice. Instead of freedom from court
work being conducive to the development
of ability as a giver of legal advice, just
the reverse seems to be true. The barristers as a class are a most learned body
of lawyers. From their ranks the Eng
lish judges are drawn. To them is due
the credit for English legal efficiency,
because they are experts in procedure.
Trials conducted by such men, gifted by
native ability and rich in a long and varied experience in the conduct of litigation, could not fail to be models of rapid
and accurate work. To them the court
room is the shrine of the law. Instead
of belittling procedure they exalt it as
the method by which alone rights can
be safely, quickly, and accurately determined.
I take it to be clear, therefore, that the
professional equipment of the lawyer
ought to include a reasonable familiarity
with the fundamental rules under which
remedies are obtained in the courts. And
it follows that the law schools, which are
established to prepare lawyers for professional work, ought to do what is rea-
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sonably possible to give them the necessary training in the principles of procedure.
There is, as I look at it, a striking and
far-reaching difference in the functions
of the colleges of liberal arts and the
professional schools. Both are established in the public interest. But while the
aim of the former is to develop individual
character and mental strength, the latter
are expected to produce efficient practitioners. It is of little concern to the college educator whether his students study
mathematics, or Greek, or history, for
he knows that all roads lead to Rome.
He wants to develop the mental powers
of his students and to bring them into
contact with the best thought of the
world's great minds. If he does this he
does his duty, for he turns out men with
the furnishings and training requisite to
broad citizenship. Not so with the professional school. Its task is to train men
to do well the technical work expected
from their profession. It looks to skillful performance in certain lines of activity. The test of its success is the efficiency of its output. The gradually increasing entrance requirements among the
better professional schools mean nothing
else than a recognition of the truth that
such schools are not a part of the general
educational system, but are institutions
into which the already educated man
comes for special t-raining to fit him for
a special service. The law school does
not justify its existence by contending
that a legally trained mind makes a good
citizen, though that may be entirely true.
It justifies itself by asserting that the
country needs well-trained lawyers and
by showing that it can produce them.
Accordingly, the law schools, in order to
fully fill the place for which they have
been created and maintained, should give
their students a complete preparation for

all that the practice of the profession will
afterwards demand of them.
But the truth is that the schools have
never taken hold of procedure in a thoroughgoing and comprehensive way.
They have followed the beaten path and
nothing more. The great foundation
subjects of contracts, torts, and property
have been developed with consummate
skill, and are presented in the better
schools with a breadth of philosophical
insight which leaves little to be desired.
Instead of being taught in isolated, fragmentary bits, the whole subject in its logical completeness is unfolded before the
student, so that he feels and understands
its principles, its boundaries, its purposes, and its relations. Such a method of
study develops a feeling or attitude toward a subject which becomes a sort of
intuitive guide in the solution of its
problems. Such a method produces results which time cannot destroy, and the
student's knowledge does not melt away
with the first lapse of memory.
Why is not procedure taken up in
the same far-sighted way? It is not because of any want of importance, as has
already been shown. Apparently the
schools have not progressed far enough
yet.
No school teaches procedure under
that name. Few teach it at all. Most
schools teach pleading and evidence, with
a course on equity practice and another
on criminal procedure. Such a division
of subjects is like separate courses on
consideration and promises instead of a
course on contracts, in which the main
thing would be left out, namely, the corelation of the parts, which is the real
significance of each. But the case of
procedure is worse. For if all the parts
of a subject are taught even in fragments, there is at least no positive gap
left unfilled. But the procedure subjects
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taught in most law schools do not cover
procedure. Not only is the co6rdination
of parts missing, but one of the chief
parts is itself a fugitive and an outcast.
If procedure is looked at in a broad
way, it is a single subject. Its aim, as
already pointed out, is to supply a mechanism for litigation. One purpose runs
through it all, and all its parts fit together
like cogs in a gear. Pleadings are drawn
to present issues for trial; trials are had
to determine issues raised by the pleadings. Rules of evidence determine admissibility, but the foundation of the
proof is the pleadings. The jury must
base its verdict and the court its decision
upon what the pleadings allege and the
evidence tends to prove, and instructions
are to be drawn within the scope of both.
The same principles which limit evidence
place restrictions upon the conduct and
argument of counsel. Upon the relation
between the pleadings and the evidence
depends the right to take the case from
the jury. Appeals and writs of error
call in question principles of pleading, of
evidence, and of trial practice. In truth,
the writ, the pleadings, the trial, the verdict, the judgment, and the appeal are a
connected series of elements each one depending upon the others, each comprehensible only through the others, each
supplementary to the rest. To isolate
pleading and evidence, take them out of
their setting, treat them as absolute instead of relative, and ignore the rest of
the subject, is misleading. Only when
one understands the problems, the purpose, and the logic of procedure as a
whole can he understand the real significance of the rules relating to its separate
branches.
The truth probably is that the most important as well as the most illuminating
portion of procedure is trial practice,
which the law schools largely ignore.

The trial is the end and essence of procedure. It is the center about which all
other procedure subjects revolve. To
really understand the trial is to understand procedure. The pleadings lead up
to it, the evidence is part and parcel of
it, the appeal grows out of it. The trial
is the heart of procedure.
A glance at the function of the jury in
the modern trial at law will make the
point clear. It is the jury which is the
characteristic feature of the trial, coloring all its phases and determining most
of its rules. This is the institution which
has made common-law procedure what
it is. There is scarcely anything about
the trial, from the pleadings to the writ
of error, which does not reflect the influence of this unique feature of English
and American legal development. The
pleadings are drawn to produce issues
triable to a jury; the trial opens with the
selection of the jury; the conduct of
counsel, from opening statement to final
argument, is hedged about with restrictions due to the presence of the jury;
the rules of evidence are all devised to
meet the peculiar requirements of the
jury; the whole theory of nonsuits and
directed verdicts arises out of the division of functions between court and jury; the difficult and important subject
of instructions to the jury obviously rests
upon the same conception; special interrogatories and special verdicts are merely devices for penetrating into the conscience of the jury; new trials, with
their vastly complicated rules, were devised and are granted as a safeguard
against perverse verdicts of juries; the
verdict is the final decision of the jury
and it fixes the character of the judgment; and the writ of error is sued out
or the appeal is taken in most cases because the appellant believes he can convince the court that some error was corn-

The Teaching of Practice and Procedure in Law Schools
mitted in the presence of the jury which
prejudicially influenced its verdict, and
he prays for a reversal and another trial
before another jury.
Equity procedure is much simpler.
But with it I am not now concerned. It
is usually taught in connection with equity pleading and gives little trouble.
Now, if the whole doctrine of civil
procedure at law has been developed and
is administered with a view to preserving
the division of functions between the
court and jury, segregating issues and
questions of fact from issues and questions of law, that conception would appear to offer a logical center about which
to group the various special subjects embraced within the general field. And
that means that Trial Practice, which
concerns itself with the rules relating to
the conduct of the trial itself, is the essential and significant title in procedure.
A well-balanced system of instruction
in procedure ought therefore to group
all procedure branches about the trial as
the procedural center. They should be
co6rdinated with a view to their purpose
as ancillary and incidental to the trial,
for their meaning, scope, and importance
are strictly dependent thereon.
The teaching of trial practice has
scarcely been attempted in most of the
law schools of this country. And the
reason probably lies in the failure to
clearly distinguish between trial practice
as a body of well-defined and accurately
developed principles of procedure and
trial practice as a vague and shadowy
discourse on success in advocacy. The
law schools cannot undertake to teach
men how to read character; how to cultivate an impressive manner; how to
skillfully interrogate a witness; how and
when to appeal to the emotions of the
jury; how to delicately flatter or severely arraign. They cannot teach resource-
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fulness and tact. The art of expression
and the skill of strategy are outside the
proper scope of the schools of law. All
of these things are as necessary in selling goods or teaching school as in practicing law. The art of advocacy is the
art of life, and only life can teach what
life is.
But if trial practice is viewed as the
keystone of a systematic scheme of procedure, concerning itself with the principles by which the problems pertaining
to the conduct of the trial are analyzed
and solved, it becomes a very different
thing. Such a subject is accurate, logical, and professionally technical. It concerns the very essence of procedure, and
it is as solidly intellectual as any other
branch of the law.
A glance at the subject-matter embraced by the notion of the trial will at once
disclose its adaptability to law school instruction. It includes the scope, plan,
and purpose of the statutory systems for
obtaining venires, and the theory of their
interpretation; the doctrines relative to
the examination of jurors on their voir
dire, and bias and challenges; the functions of the opening statement and the
right to open and close; the principles
underlying the different methods of withdrawing the case from the jury, such as
nonsuit, directed verdict, and demurrer
to the evidence; the theory and practice
of preparing instructions for the jury;
the purpose and propriety of special interrogatories and special verdicts; the
doctrine of new trials and the conditions
and limitations under which they may be
granted; the rules regulating the conduct of counsel while in the presence of
the jury.
All these subjects, with perhaps two
or three others, are of primary importance to the lawyer who appears in court.
They have been worked out accurately
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and comprehensively by the courts in a
vast array of decisions. They are based
on the closest logic and the broadest policy. They have called forth the best
thought of able judges. They lie at the
very heart of our judicial system, for of
what value are rights if remedies fail.
The trial serves a single and perfectly
4efinite purpose. Trial practice, which
concerns its conduct, is not a mere collection of unrelated rules, but a closely
articulated subject, in which every part
bears a demonstrable relation to every
other and to the whole. A study of it
gives unity to procedure, and puts vitality into many a dry rule. Pleading and
evidence can never stand forth in their
true significance until they have been
given their proper place as incidents of
the trial.
Now, so far as concerns the question,
how to teach practice, it is quite obvious
that the principles of the subject can be
taught in exactly the same way as any
other branch of the law, except that I
believe the case system is more imperatively necessary than elsewhere. In all
procedure subjects the principles depend
so intimately on the facts of the cases in
hand that they mean little when divorced
from the facts. And this is especially
true of trial practice.
One common fallacy has perhaps done
much to deter the schools from seriously
taking up the subject, and that is the
prevalent idea that trial practice is essentially local in its close dependence ory
statutes and court rules. But the reverse
is more nearly the truth. The basic
principles underlying the subject are absolutely general in their scope and application. Variations occur in minor points,
but I believe there is no subject of the
law, either in procedure or the substantive branches, where there is less diversity in fundamentals and in the princi-

ples of interpretation than in trial practice.
If it be conceded that trial practice
should be taught, another step logically
suggests itself. The student of chemistry is taught the principles of qualitative
analysis, but he is also taught how to put
those principles to use in analyzing unknown combinations of chemical substances. The engineering student is
taught in shop courses how to apply the
principles learned in the books. Medical
and dental students have clinical cases to
work upon. Why should not the law
student have cases in procedure? The
practice court constitutes the affirmative
answer of many law schools to this question. But I am inclined to think that the
development of practice courts has been
hampered by an incorrect conception of
their true function.
A practice court is certainly not a mere
imitation of a real court. It cannot survive amid the press of work in the brief
period allowed for modern legal education unless it does something more than
allow men to play they are lawyers. Going through the motions of a trial, even
under the supervision and criticism of a
competent teacher, is in itself a comparatively unproductive process.
On the contrary, the practice court
should be a means and method for actually co6rdinating the various branches of
procedure. It should furnish an opportunity for the students to marshal the
principles of procedure as studied theoretically, and employ them in analyzing
and solving specific problems of litigation. It should teach a method of attack.
To do this it must provide much more
than a court room, a judge, and a jury.
To produce a law school trial which
shall serve a useful educational purpose,
there must be two things: First, a set of
facts must be developed analogous to the
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facts in a litigated controversy; and, second, there must be a thorough and technical preparation of those facts in all
their legal possibilities, by students representing both sides of the controversy.
The first may be done by arranging
actual transactions among students selected from the school, and carrying them
out in such a way that issues of fact respecting them shall develop. Suppose a
dozen men are called upon to serve as
actors and witnesses in a case. The
character under which each appears,
such as that of a contractor or a bank
cashier, is assumed. In that capacity
each proceeds to take the part assigned,
carrying on conversations, executing papers, writing letters, telephoning, or doing
whatever is requisite to fill out the schedule of events which the instructor has devised to raise suitable issues of fact. It
is easy for the actors to be coached as to
what to do and say. After the words are
spoken or the acts are performed, they
become as properly the subject of future
investigation as do any of those events
which form the basis of actual lawsuits.
The actors can truthfully testify as to
what they did; the witnesses may relate
what they saw and heard. The case exists only in the doings of those actors,
and students assigned to the case as attorneys have access to the same sort of
evidence that the practicing lawyer deals
with. The case is in every sense an actual case, though artificially produced.
It is not assumed. Practically everything that will be shown in evidence will
have actually happened.
Having created this foundation for the
action, the preparation of the case proceeds along strictly professional lines.
And it is here that the chief educational
value of the work appears. The theory of the prosecution and defense must
be worked out, the pleadings must be
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drawn, the evidence must be arranged
in proper form for orderly and logical
presentation in court, the rules respecting
proof must be carefully gone over to insure against exclusion at the trial, the
probabilities of objections being raised at
the trial must be estimated and contingencies prepared for, instructions properly covering the law of the case must
be drawn, the feasibility of employing
special interrogatories must be determined, the qualifications of the jurors must
be investigated and grounds for challenge fixed upon. In doing all these
things the student is really employing the
principles of procedure. He is given a
case at large. The entire responsibility
for it rests upon him. He must work it
out from beginning to end, and his work
is essentially a lawyer's work. It calls
in question all the knowledge of the principles of procedure which he has obtained in the course of his previous study.
He draws his pleadings with a view to
his evidence; he prepares his evidence in
the light of his pleadings.
His case is no moot question of abstract right, but a living issue to be tried
and tested in the delicate balances of the
court room. Before him stretches the
long road which leads to the jury's verdict, with its dangers and pitfalls, its
sharp declivities, its sudden turns. To
travel it successfully calls for all his
knowledge and skill, all his foresight,
alertness, and sound judgment. He
must weigh the possibilities involved in
this choice or that, the advantages of
success, the consequences of failure.
And in every problem which throws its
shadow across his path is involved a co6rdination of the. rules of law and the
rules of procedure-of the substance and
method. Such a discipline is typical of
the lawyer's tasks. To meet it success-
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fully is the test of professional preparation.
This preparation may be easily supervised and criticized. A trial brief may
be required, which shall contain the results of all the work done preliminary to
the trial. Such a brief should contain
a clear statement of the theory of the
cause of action or defense relied upon,
fortified by ample authorities, together
with a close analysis of the pleadings
filed, to demonstrate both the formal and
substantial sufficiency of the pleadings
under the theory adopted. It should
contain a statement of the possible positions open to the other side, and an analysis of the adversary's pleadings to show
their sufficiency or insufficiency, and a
specification of the available methods for
raising any objections which this analysis
may disclose. It should contain a full
outline of the evidence available in support of all the issues made in the pleadings, and the witnesses should be listed,
each name to be followed with a schedule
of the facts to be proved by him. There
should be specific references to all doubtful points connected with the admissibility of evidence, and methods of proof,
with authorities in support of the positions taken by counsel. There should be
a full set of instructions to the jury, each
followed by authorities and reasons in
support of its form and substance.
Such a trial brief is just what every
lawyer should have before him in every
case which he tries. To prepare it requires a close and intelligent study of every phase of the case, and represents legal effort highly beneficial to the student
and strictly professional in its scope. No
student will ordinarily fail to understand
his case in all its phases after working
out a satisfactory trial brief along these
lines.
The trial itself, when it finally takes

place, is merely the realization and execution of the plans prepared and exhibited in the trial brief. A jury of students
can easily be had who will themselves derive a large benefit from their critical observation of the performances of their
classmates. The case will proceed before the jury like an ordinary law case.
But the trial itself should not be looked upon as a mere imitation of an actual
lawsuit. As an imitation it amounts to
nothing. What the students need is an
opportunity to put their knowledge of
law and procedure to actual use, and to
avail themselves beneficially of those
principles about which they obtained a
theoretical understanding in their classroom courses. To that end the instructor who presides in the court should not
forget that he is instructing students, not
impersonating a judge. He should keep
the case moving along proper lines. He
should criticize and correct freely. If
mistakes occur and are not noticed by the
men trying the case, they should be
promptly suggested by the judge, and the
point involved may be thus brought home
very forcibly to the student, with all the
flavor of a concrete setting. Frequent
questions on the part of the judge as to
principles involved in the various steps
taken during the course of the trial will
emphasize and direct sharp attention to
the logical groundwork of the procedural
development exemplified in the case. A
general criticism of salient features of
the trial may well follow the rendition of
the verdict.
A practice court conducted along these
lines is not an appeal to the spectacular,
but a serious educational institution. It
is pedagogically sound. It is entirely
practicable under the conditions prevalent in modern law schools. It stirs the
students to their best efforts, and gives
them correct ideas about procedure. It

Annual Address-Section on Legal Education
is the only method so far devised for
teaching the technique of the profession
in a concrete way. It is to the law school
what the clinic is to the medical school
or the shop to the school of engineering.
In short, it presents a synthetic grouping
of legal ideas about the trial as the logical center of legal activity.
The law schools have been too unsystematic with their whole procedural program. They have considered procedure
courses as an unscholarly necessity-a
form of surrender to popular demands.
In common-law pleading, which is everywhere taught, the emphasis has been too
much laid on the forms of action and
the historical aspects of the subject, thus
making it a sort of dumping ground for
the history of the common law, instead
of viewing it as a highly articulated and
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logical process for developing a foundation for the trial of issues. A broad curriculum would include pleading, both
civil and criminal, evidence, trial practice,
and appellate procedure, followed by
practice court work as a summation or
integration of the other branches. Careful instruction along these lines ought to
accomplish substantial results in preparing students to do the thing for which
the bar primarily exists, namely to practice law. The law schools have an opportunity to do a great work in raising.
the standards of practice which all admit are so low in the United States, and:
in doing something to compensate the
American bar for the want of that procedural specializing which makes English
legal administration the envy of the
world.

